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Will Superfund Rise Again?
The federal hazardous waste cleanup program and its state progeny
have been in decline for more than a decade, victims to a campaign of
sabotage waged by industry and neglected by the Bush administration.
Meanwhile, stakeholders do their best to ignore the program’s sorry state.
A sad story, but there may be a surprise ending in store
RENA STEINZOR

I

n the dog days of last summer, New
good money after bad. The industry taxes that
Jersey environmental ofﬁcials showed
support it expired in 1995 and have never been
up to inspect what they thought was an
renewed. Efforts to drastically reform Little Superabandoned brownﬁelds site
fund statutes, all proposed under the
to test local air quality. They
rubric of reclaiming abandoned urban
sites through “voluntary cleanups,”
were startled to discover a
took statehouses by storm. The result
day care center operating in
was a slew of programs that pressured
the former thermometer plant. A quick
state agencies to get sites off cleanup
air sampling showed that infants
lists by implementing inexpensive
and toddlers were being exposed to
“institutional controls” like deed remercury vapors 27 times the acceptable
strictions or perimeter fencing in lieu
level. Ofﬁcials immediately cleared
of removing or physically containing
the building, and the ﬁnger-pointing
the wastes.
began. The most prominent charge was
The culture changing aspect of
that the state had previously ignored
these developments cannot be underthe site to beneﬁt former Governor Rena Steinzor, the Jacob
stated. These days, savvy Washington
J a m e s M c G re e v e y ’ s d e v e l o p e r A. France Research
cronies, a perhaps understandable but Professor at the University
insiders would rather light up a ciganonetheless misleading explanation of Maryland School
rette at their desks than admit that the
masking the real reason such episodes of Law, worked on the
entire multi-billion-dollar Superfund
will occur with growing frequency in Superfund Amendments
effort has any redeeming social value.
the years ahead: the systematic failure and Reauthorization
Environmentalists have walked away
of federal and state toxic waste cleanup
from cleanup programs at both the
Act when she served
programs across the country. Because
federal and state level, concluding that
New Jersey’s “Little Superfund” as Staff Counsel for the
reviving Superfund and ﬁghting off
program is among the most effective House Subcommittee on
state reforms are fool’s errands. Only
in the nation, the discovery of this Commerce, Transportation, the environmental justice movement
nightmarish scenario shocked even and Tourism from 1983continues to denounce this retreat
88. A board member of
Superfund cognoscenti.
from the toxic waste cleanup wars,
It’s not possible to pinpoint the exact the Center for Progressive
occasionally pricking the conscience
date, but sometime in the early 1990s Reform, she is grateful
of government ofﬁcials or foundation
it became disreputable to advocate to CPR Policy Analyst
staffers, who fund conferences where
cleaning up contaminated sites in any- Margaret Clune, who cotiny circles of veterans can come tothing approaching a thorough manner. authored the report that
gether to remember and regret.
The federal Superfund program was
All of this is small comfort to the
inspired this article.
branded an embarrassment that threw
parents who sent their children to
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the Kiddie Kollege day care center in Franklin
program to address a nationwide problem. It creTownship, New Jersey, and, after the scandal
ated the Superfund, a trust fund fed by a broad tax
broke, trudged to meetings with state and local
on industry to allow jump starting cleanups with
ofﬁcials where they screamed until they were
federal funds. And it imposed stringent liability
hoarse. Within days, the parents had a toxic tort
on companies for improperly disposed hazardous
lawyer and a ﬁstful of apologies, along with the
waste, which would both replenish the fund and
particularly idiotic pronouncement of one state
compel a broad array of voluntary cleanups.
public health ofﬁcial who was quoted in a local
These days, the program feels like a bad adnewspaper as advising that even if children were
aptation of the Bill Murray movie Groundhog Day
exposed to dangerous levels of mercury, they
— the same sites, both federal and state, keep
would not suffer long-term effects.
popping up, their issues unresolved, sometimes
As unimportant as the big picture may seem in
for decades. But sooner or later some form of
the heat of such moments, this group and all the
phoenix must rise from this morass in the form of
other groups that will face similar crises — as well
public demands for effective cleanup, triggering
as the one American in four who lives within three
a costly and time-consuming effort to invent new
miles of a site on Superfund’s National Priorities
programs at the federal, state, and local level.
List — deserve to know the truth. Federal and
If the world’s smartest strategists were focusstate hazardous waste cleanup programs have
ing on the problem, they would advise all of the
become the victims of sabotage
program’s stakeholders to take
— an extraordinarily effective
bold action now to control their
public relations campaign by the
fate. The oil and chemical indusThese days, savvy
insurance industry to discredit
try could try to kill the federal
the program and the statute and,
program, laying responsibility
Washington
more recently, the audacious
for the entire problem at the
use of doublespeak by senior
doorsteps of the states. Enviinsiders would
Bush administration ofﬁcials to
ronmentalists could agree to live
rather light up a
fool Congress and the public.
without ample federal funding
Meanwhile, a profound case of
in exchange for strong citizen
cigarette at their
compassion fatigue has gripped
suit enforcement that shifts the
the thousands of regulators,
burden of proof on cleanup to
desks than admit
environmentalists, and politiresponsible parties, awarding
cians who otherwise would have
a bounty to the groups that
that Superfund
turned back this assault.
brought the cases to court. Or
has any redeeming insurers could renew their ﬁght
For the foreseeable future,
federal Superfund sites seem
to repeal the law’s stringent lisocial value
destined to remain no man’s
ability, turning Superfund into
lands, seeping chemicals into the
a multi-billion-dollar public
ground while cleanup remains
works program.
at a halt. As for ostensibly less serious state sites,
Locked in an iron triangle of their own makdevelopers will recycle those that are delisted but
ing, however, industry, environmentalists, and
still contaminated into day care centers, schools,
insurers are so deeply committed to ignoring
shopping malls, and apartment houses. Some
Superfund’s death throes that these scenarios
people will get sick at these locations without
seem remote to the point of being fanciful. Instead,
knowing why. Inevitably, though, natural proan even greater surprise may be in the making.
cesses, human activities, and time will take their
The proverbial phoenix could well resemble the
toll and scandals like the one in New Jersey will
imperfect compromise Congress adopted a quaremerge at a growing number of locations. A few
ter century ago.
big Superfund NPL sites will catch on ﬁre and
Symptoms of Sabotage
others will overﬂow, spilling nasty chemicals into
the street and landing our nation’s quarter-cenN
Neglect
. The Superfund National Priorities
tury-old effort to clean up hazardous waste sites
List includes 1,244 sites awaiting cleanup; many
once again on the front pages.
have languished on the NPL for more than twenty
It is hard to envision a happy ending to Superyears. Early on it became clear that, to do the job
fund’s saga, a story that began with Times Beach
right, the program would continue for decades.
and Love Canal, and the resulting bipartisan effort
Cleanup is extremely difﬁcult from a technical
in Congress to pass the Comprehensive Environperspective. The sites typically contain noxious
mental Response, Compensation, and Liability
mixtures of solid and liquid wastes that inﬁltrate
Act of 1980. CERCLA established a dual track
soil, surface water, and groundwater. Many
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are too large to allow excavation, leaving
physical containment as the only option. But
stakeholders across the political spectrum
have consistently overlooked this reality,
instead focusing almost exclusively on the
management problems that have dogged
Superfund since its inception.
To be sure, the program is not easy to
administer, blending an extraordinarily
stringent, perpetually controversial strict,
joint, and several liability scheme designed
to extract cleanup funding from the parties
responsible for creating the sites with a corporate-tax-supported, multi-billion-dollar
bank account — the Superfund — that allows EPA to jump start cleanups, bring lawsuits imposing liability, and pay for orphan
sites where no viable responsible parties can
be located. In addition, when Superfund was
barely ﬁve years old, midway through the
Reagan administration, mismanagement
and scandal at EPA had already provoked
its ﬁrst rescue mission.
The Bush I and Clinton administrations
did relatively well by the program, deploying trained professionals to implement a
series of administrative reforms that raised
the number of sites where construction was
deemed complete into the range of 85 annually. But the 1995 expiration of the
program’s stable “polluter pays”
tax base soon began to take a toll.
When the Bush II administration
Passion fatigue
took ofﬁce, the new principle that
seems to
“the polluter need not pay” went
from de facto to official policy.
have gripped
Cumulative appropriations for the
period 2000–2004 were between
thousands of
$1.3–$1.75 billion short of what
the program actually needed, acregulators,
cording to a report to Congress
environmentalists by Resources for the Future. The
Clinton administration routinely
and politicians
asked Congress to reinstate the
taxes; Bush II did not. Similarly,
enforcement and general program
activity stalled under Bush II. In
2001, construction completions dropped by
half and have stayed there since. Private
party commitments for future cleanup also
fell precipitously.
Before the corporate taxes expired, they
put approximately $1.5 billion into the trust
fund annually, or about $4 million a day.
Three categories of taxes fed the fund: a
broad-based corporate tax and assessments
on crude oil by the barrel and chemical
feedstock taxes by the ton. The taxes were
3 0
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always controversial, largely because companies felt that they were being asked to pay
twice: once when the government imposed
liability and again when they paid taxes
on their revenues. This argument ignores
the fact that Congress decided to tax the
industry as a whole rather than hit up the
taxpayer for a problem historically created
by the industry as a whole. To put the controversy into perspective, consider that the
revenues lost to the trust fund last year were
equivalent to the proﬁts earned by the top
six oil companies in only a week. Indeed, the
salaries of their CEOs alone would add up to
one month of those lost revenues. From 199399, public money paid for approximately a
ﬁfth of the program, the corporate taxes paid
the rest. By 2004, the taxes in the fund were
entirely depleted. Today, the public pays the
entire cost.
Without tax revenues or enforcement to
compel private cleanup, the sites languished.
In a recent report, The Toll of Superfund Neglect: Toxic Waste Dumps & Communities at
Risk, the Center for American Progress and
the Center for Progressive Reform published
the results of a study of the ﬁve worst nonmilitary NPL sites in each of the ten most
populous states — California, Texas, New
York, Florida, Illinois, Pennsylvania, Ohio,
Michigan, New Jersey, and Georgia — for a
total of 50 sites. All have Hazard Ranking
System scores between 42.24 and 74.86, well
above the 28.5 required for listing. Most are
located in heavily populated urban or suburban neighborhoods. Median incomes for
residents of 30 of the 50 census tracts around
the sites are below — often well below — the
nation’s $41,994. Thirteen of the 50 census
tracts have populations that are at least 40
percent racial or ethnic minority, including
four with percentages greater than 70.
Some sites lack any responsible party.
But in many other cases, cleanups have
languished even though obviously viable
parties are available. For example, a 75-acre
New Jersey site owned by Honeywell was
listed in 1983; last year, Honeywell ranked
number 75 on the Fortune 500, with proﬁts
topping $1.2 billion. Such examples conﬁrm
the work of the author of the aforementioned
report to Congress, RFF’s Katherine Probst,
the nation’s most prominent independent
Superfund expert. She found that responsible parties are available to shoulder responsibility for cleanup at a signiﬁcant number
of NPL sites if EPA enforcement were not as
ﬂawed as the rest of its cleanup effort.
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A Program For Lawyers, Not Cleanup
Are the sites more than just an
eyesore? Approximately 4.5 million
gallons of liquid waste heavily laced
with such volatile organic compounds
as vinyl chloride, benzene, and trichloroethylene were dumped in unlined lagoons at the Honeywell site, polluting
the nearby Hackensack River Basin.
Similarly, the 85-acre Bofors-Nobel site
in Muskegon County, Michigan, was
ﬁrst listed in 1988, with responsible
parties that include American Cyanamid, Akzo-Nobel, Bissell Corporation,
DuPont, Eli Lilly, General Electric,
IBM, and Union Carbide. Unlined
lagoons were used for disposal of
wastes generated by the production of
alcohol-based detergents, pesticides,
herbicides, and dye intermediaries.
Several of the 50 sites contain chemicals such as creosote and lead that are
now banned for most purposes. Over
the decades, these substances spilled
onto the ground, where they seeped
into aquifers or were washed by rain
into adjacent storm sewers, rivers, or
creeks. For example, from 1902-81, the
American Creosote Works (Pensacola
Pit) site in Escambia County, Florida,
housed ponds set up to “percolate”
wastes that routinely overﬂowed, spilling their contents into Bayou Chico
and Pensacola Bay.
Notoriety is no guarantee of accomplishment. The infamous 17-acre
Stringfellow site, used as a hazardous
waste disposal facility from 1956-72,
was front-page news when Superfund was reauthorized in 1986 and
remains on the NPL today. It accepted
over 34 million gallons of waste from
metal reﬁnishing, electroplating, and
pesticide manufacturing companies,
dumping the toxic compounds into
surface evaporation ponds. The 550acre LCP Chemicals site in coastal
Glynn County, Georgia, was used for
seven decades as an oil reﬁnery, paint
manufacturing plant, power plant, and
chlor-alkali factory. EPA estimates that
more than 380,000 pounds of highly
toxic mercury was “lost” between
1955-79. Commercial ﬁshing has been
banned in the area.
Last but not least, the Normandy
Park Apartments site in Hillsborough
County, Florida, was proposed for listing in February 1995, but EPA never

H

as Superfund been successful during its twenty-six
year history? Depends on
whose side of the toxic fence you’ve
been on. The statute’s intent was
to clean up hazardous waste sites
and to seek restitution for these
costs from responsible parties. The
program has been successful in
identifying and investigating sites,
but not in cleaning them
up. What went wrong?
Unfortunately, the law’s
intent has been abused at
the whim of an arbitrary
bureaucracy.
Under the statute, Superfund liability is retroactive and strict, which
means that the governJoseph
ment does not need to
prove fault to impose responsibility
for cleanup. This liability extends
to cleanup of wastes disposed of
at any time in the past. Superfund
liability is also joint and several,
meaning that anyone connected
with a site can be forced to pay the
total cleanup bill, no matter how
limited their participation.
EPA used these authorities to
create a “lawyers first, shovels
later” approach, which is not really
a fair system for all stakeholders. A
waste generator that gave its waste
to a legitimate disposal company
that took it to a licensed landﬁll
is still liable for cleaning up the
entire landﬁll. So is the transporter.
Companies in full compliance with
operational and disposal standards
are treated with the same regard
as the midnight dumper; the legality of the company’s actions is
irrelevant.
In addition, there are few checks
and balances on how EPA appropriates funds for site investigation and
cleanup. Cost control of work performed at Superfund sites has been
strongly criticized by independent
auditors and the Government Accountability Ofﬁce. Analysts at Resources for the Future estimate that
cleanup costs of sites controlled by
potentially responsible parties are
15 to 20 percent less than the costs

of government-controlled cleanups.
Organized political interests, burdensome bureaucratic processes,
unrealistic cleanup standards, and
poor oversight created a system
ripe for wasteful practices. Some 70
percent of today’s cleanup funds
come from responsible parties;
elimination of wasteful spending
practices would go a long way to
make up the missing 30
percent.
The spine of the insurance industry was
nearly broken over asbestos and lead claims
in the 1970s, when along
came the massive bills to
clean up identiﬁed hazardous waste sites. By
Kulak
the early 1990s estimates
of the insurance industry’s liability
resulting from Superfund litigation
ranged from $26 billion to $213
billion. Under “lawyers ﬁrst,” the
money spent by insurers for legal
expenses was running at 90 percent
of total Superfund claims.
Adjusting to these new exposures, the insurance industry
introduced “absolute” and “total”
pollution exclusions in standard
property and general liability policies, effectively halting payments
under new policies for pollution
claims. But insurance companies
are still burdened with unquantiﬁable claims reserves for legacy
pollution claims. Today, with few
sites being cleaned up and little accountability, the insurance industry
has every right — no, the responsibility — to question the logic of
the statute’s liability scheme and
to lobby for better management of
these funds.
Fixing Superfund needs to start
with legal reform and ﬁscal discipline ﬁrst. Throwing money at
a problem without accountability
or even a clear path forward is not
the solution.
Joseph Kulak is Vice President, National Environmental Practice, of Hilb
Rogal & Hobbs, the nation’s ei
eighth
largest insurance brokerage ﬁrm, in its
Malvern, Pennsylvania, ofﬁce.
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ﬁnalized the listing, claiming that it is still
“cooperating” with responsible parties on
a voluntary cleanup. The site once housed
a recycling operation that involved crushing batteries and smelting lead. Apartment
buildings were later built on the site and they
remain occupied.
Rhetoric. For two decades, the insurance
industry has spent uncounted millions on a
largely successful campaign to convince the
public and their elected representatives that
Superfund is an irremediable ﬁasco. Insurers
claim that lawyers are the only beneﬁciaries
of the program and that affected communities would be far better off if Superfund were
converted into a public works program, with
liability all but eliminated. They rail against
the “fundamental unfairness” of the liability scheme, which punishes hardworking
businesses by exacting huge sums for the
results of activities that were perfectly legal
at the time. The campaign for the repeal of
liability at taxypayers’ expense has never
achieved political traction, but it has ruined
Superfund’s reputation for effectiveness and,
as important, fairness.
The insurers’ success was achieved
without the active cooperation of their customers until relatively recently. The largest
petrochemical companies were the
ﬁrst target of Superfund enforcement and, by the late 1980s, most
The insurance
had established effective internal
processes for evaluating sites, acindustry has
cepting responsibility for cleanup,
spent millions
and ﬁnding other responsible parties to share the costs. They were
to convince
deeply resentful of environmentalists for dubbing them the “pollutthe public and
ers” who must be made to pay, but
with grim corporate efﬁciency they
elected ofﬁcials
made the best of a bad situation.
that Superfund is As the insurers’ rhetoric escalated,
they soldiered on, even negotiata ﬁasco
ing a short-lived compromise with
environmentalists for a second
reauthorization of the program in
1994 that was washed away by the Contract
with America.
Over the past decade, anemic enforcement has taken its toll on these efforts to the
point that corporate cleanups have dwindled
along with the rest of the program. In its
2004 decision Cooper Industries, Inc.v. Aviall
Services, Inc., the Supreme Court worsened
these dynamics by curtailing cost recovery
unless cleanup was done pursuant to a
federal government order. Underfunded
3 2

❖

T H E E N V I R O N M E N TA L F O R U M

and overmatched, EPA is often incapable of
providing this route to cost-sharing, fatally
undermining corporate incentives to volunteer. To add injury to this legal insult, the
Court was egged on by the Bush II Justice
Department, which ﬁled a brief against the
company that had done the right thing without EPA enforcement.
Double Speak. On a very few occasions,
senior political appointees in the Bush II administration have deigned to testify before
Congress or made other public statements
about Superfund’s pitiable state. Even accounting for the duress the program provokes in anyone held accountable for its poor
performance, these remarks have reached
new heights in disingenuous and misleading
doublespeak. In 2004, Marianne Horinko,
bumped up to acting EPA administrator
from her post as assistant administrator in
the Ofﬁce of Solid Waste and Emergency
Response, claimed that “the link between the
Superfund tax and EPA’s cleanup budget is
one of those urban myths, like giant alligators
in the sewer system. There are no alligators,
and there is no link.” Instead, she claimed,
reinstating industry taxes would make no
difference because low annual appropriations
reﬂect the “funding pressure” on all federal
programs. Horinko’s successor at OSWER,
Susan Bodine, has made similar claims.
In a limited sense, Horinko and Bodine
are correct: because today’s program is supported by general taxpayer revenues, appropriations for cleanup must compete with
appropriations for everything from the war in
Iraq to Katrina relief. If corporate taxes were
reinstated, however, the law says that those
funds cannot be spent on any purpose except NPL cleanup. Taxes would increase the
fund’s balance and no one could raid them
for other purposes. Then, Superfund’s only
remaining problem would be that the president and Congress have been leaving the
money in the fund because those amounts,
however modest, count as an offset against
deﬁcit spending.
The Trickle-Down Effect. The states’
T
Little Superfund reforms were based on the
reasonable premise that contaminated property blights urban and suburban landscapes,
impeding economic development. In recent
years, many states amended their laws to give
developers incentives to reclaim the sites,
including liability releases and state funding
for site evaluation. Predictably, the pressure
of demonstrating win-win progress through
such “third generation” approaches has com-

Copyright © 2006, Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, D.C. www.eli.org. Reprinted by permission from The Environmental Forum®, November/December 2006

❖

pelled state ofﬁcials to approve hasty cleanups, clearing sites off their various lists.
In an especially troubling trend that has
never been evaluated comprehensively, “institutional controls” increasingly are used in
lieu of any physical containment of wastes.
This euphemistic term of art refers to the use
of perimeter fencing and paper commitments
like deed restrictions to justify state decisions
to approve sites for reuse as industrial or
commercial property. Such “remedies” do
not always limit people’s physical access to
toxic hot spots that are left behind. In theory,
state ofﬁcials “enforce” such restrictions. In
practice, states are so starved for resources
that oversight is neglected. A few years ago,
EPA tried to avert these predictable outcomes
by imposing minimum standards for such
programs but, given Superfund’s greatly
weakened condition, the agency was easily
shouted down.
The New Jersey day care center offers a
particularly painful example of how such
situations play out. According to the Newark
Star-Ledger, at some point (the date remains
unclear) the state applied for Superfund
money to pay for a short-term, emergency
cleanup. EPA rejected the request in a letter
downplaying any danger to people because
the building was vacant. The day care
center’s landlord subsequently brandished
the letter as proof that the site was deemed
“safe” by the government.

The Options
People enmeshed in acute dysfunctional
conditions like drug addiction or alcoholism
must envision alternatives well outside their
comfort zone to make any lasting change.
The same dynamic applies to reforming
Superfund. Imagine for a moment that the
most affected interest groups swallowed
truth serum that would allow them to consider radical options for the future, without
regard to political viability. Three starkly
different alternatives would immediately
become obvious.
Cancel the Federal Program. Congress
could simply repeal the federal statute
— eliminating the funding, cleanup rules,
and liability. Some transitional arrangements
might be necessary to ﬁnish the most serious
sites already on the NPL. Presumably, the
states could be tempted to take them over if
the block grant were large enough. But EPA’s
administrative structure at headquarters and
in the regions would be dismantled, leaving
behind only a small corps of people to serve

as liaison with the states. Given this sweet
carrot, affected companies might even be motivated to contribute to transitional funds.
This option would leave the companies
that have acted responsibly by undertaking
cleanup, as well as their contractors and lawyers, high and dry. Repeal would also thrust
the states into the unenviable position of
inheriting yet another difﬁcult and expensive
social problem from Washington.
The implications of administrative amputation are definitely
more mixed for Superfund’s other
Remarks
stakeholders. From the perspective
of communities and environmentalby the Bush
ists, the big downside is that less
administration
cleanup would get done as the feds
abandoned the ﬁeld and the states
have reached
struggled to gain control over the
problem. But given Superfund’s
new heights in
sorry state, it is an open question
disingenuous
how much real difference its ofﬁcial death would make, at least
and misleading
as regards listed sites. Another risk
is that, in the absence of national
doublespeak
funding and the threat of federal
enforcement, the bottom could fall
out of state programs as well, leaving sites to languish until they re-emerge in
circumstances akin to the Kiddie Kollege
ﬁasco.
The main advantage of repeal is that it
would at last be crystal clear which level of
government has responsibility for responding to citizen concerns. EPA specifically
would be much better off, at last able to turn
its back on this rich breeding ground for dissatisfaction with its performance. Without an
incompetent EPA to kick around, companies
would either have to try to shift the blame to
newly minted state ofﬁcials or stand in the
limelight on their own. Most of them have
done everything they could to avoid that
uncomfortable stance for 20 years.
Lawyers First and Last. A second alternative is to abandon the ﬁght for federal budget dollars, and convert Superfund into an
enforcement-only program. While preserving
strict, joint, and several liability, this approach would require three crucial statutory
supplements. First, Congress would adopt an
amendment to overturn the Aviall contribution case mentioned earlier, establishing an
unequivocal cause of action for contribution
even if the company volunteering for cleanup
had not so much as talked to the government
about its obligations.
Second, the statute would be changed
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to accomplish a drastic downsizing of the
government’s burden to demonstrate to
the courts what should be done at the site,
instead requiring responsible parties to
conduct such studies under court order
once EPA had proved them liable. A major
impediment to enforcement at this point
is the need to come into court with an
elaborate remedial plan in order to compel
responsible parties to take charge. Bifurcation of this burden, giving the government
the ability to order a site takeover without
knowing much about what to do, would
make enforcement substantially more affordable.
Third, like all the other major environmental laws, Superfund would have a citizen suit
provision with a similarly lower burden of
proof that puts the onus on potentially responsible parties to deﬁne cleanup. Citizens
would have the ability to collect attorneys
and technical expert fees and the statute
would award a bounty for successful plaintiffs. The bounty would be used for programs
to improve the environment, with no other
strings attached, and would be subject to
approval by the courts.
The biggest downside of this approach
for industry is obvious: exposure to multiple
legal actions that are signiﬁcantly
less well-developed than those that
squeeze through the very small
We can choose
Superfund pipeline today. The upside is the absence of the extended
a radical new
government review, agency indecidirection for
siveness, and regulatory confusion
that drive companies trying to
cleanups, or
deal responsibly with their liability crazy. For communities and
reinvigorate
environmentalists, the approach
requires a tremendous leap of faith
the compromise
that EPA will ﬁnd the backbone it
made when the
has worked so hard to lose since
the early days of Bill Ruckelshaus’s
law was passed
ﬁrst tour. An indeterminate number of sites are truly orphan and
would remain unaddressed in this
scenario, although making enforcement the
only real alternative could ﬂush the system
to the point that we really understood how
many truly belong in this category.
Shovels First and Last. In the game of
truth or dare I envision, the ﬁnal alternative would take insurers at their word and
revive Superfund from near death with a
large inﬂux of cash, in the form of general
taxpayer revenue, reinstated industry taxes,
or some combination. Congress would re3 4
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peal liability and abandon any pretense of
enforcement, converting Superfund into a
massive public works program.
The downside to this approach is the
danger that cleanup will become grossly inefﬁcient, as the Army Corps of Engineers takes
time out from building levees to discover the
cleanup technologies that have eluded us all
these years, and the equally troubling possibility that American industry could revert
to the high-minded waste disposal practices
of the past, an outcome made more likely
by anemic enforcement of federal and state
hazardous waste disposal laws.
The great advantage of this approach is the
elimination of the friction generated by fear
of liability that makes the existing program
operate so slowly. Technological problems
would remain as daunting as ever, but could
be solved in relative peace and quiet. The
government’s efforts to reclaim military
facilities contaminated by even more potent
waste deposits could inform the search for
solutions at private sites.

The Inevitable Resurrection
From the perspective of preserving the
credibility of the rule of law, if not for protecting public health, any of these three very
radical options is preferable to watching Superfund die an unofﬁcial, ignominious death.
But the fact remains that none are politically
viable for the foreseeable future. They will
remain inaccessible for as long as Superfund’s
national stakeholders have the luxury of ignoring the situation or, in other words, for as
long as the implications of the slow death of
federal and state programs remain obscure.
Yet no one familiar with Superfund’s history,
and especially the scope and severity of the
environmental contamination it was designed
to address, can believe that this state of denial
can last forever, or even a few more years. For
the Kiddie Kollege day care catastrophe is
no anomaly, but, rather, the re-emergence of
problems that never really went away.
When the inevitable happens, and sites
either de-listed or contained by institutional
controls release toxics into the environment, threatening people or wildlife, or
rainfall washes wastes from an NPL site
into the streets of adjoining neighborhoods,
stakeholders will once again stand at an unavoidable fork in the road. They can choose
between a radical new direction. Or they can
revive and re-invigorate the compromise approach Congress constructed with so much
difﬁculty 25 years ago. •

